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Abstract 
This paper reflects on current developments in the exhibition sector of the movie industry. 
It will examine why the adoption of an innovation (digital cinema), capable of 
revolutionising the movie industry, has stumbled in its attempts to cross Geoffrey 
Moore’s “chasm" (Moore, 1991) and will argue that despite numerous setbacks, d-
cinema can now rightly be considered within Christensen’s framework of disruptive 
technologies. The author will examine the strategies of exhibitors at the forefront of the 
adoption process; describe some of the emerging business models being developed to 
facilitate change; and analyse how two different territories the (international markets of 
the USA and India) are realising the opportunities afforded by this technology. Finally he 
will project the overall implications of the advent of d-cinema for the future of the global 
movie industry and how (private and public) entrepreneurs are already changing the 
basis of competition in certain sectors to create new markets. 
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Introduction 
In 1869 Charles Darwin wrote, “Natural selection acts only by taking advantage 
of slight successive variations; she can never take a great and sudden leap, but must 
advance by short and sure, though slow steps." In that same year celluloid was developed 
by John Wesley Hyatt; later to become the universal platform for delivering feature film 
across the world.  By 1900 Hollywood had emerged as the home of the US film industry 
and soon after cemented the dominant position worldwide. Since then the major players 
have arguably followed Darwin’s dictum to maintain a position of control both in terms 
of the content and revenues.  
However, the operating business practices which have successfully underpinned 
the movie industry since the early part of the 20th Century are coming under increasing 
attack. Digital cinema - aiming to replace celluloid – makes use of digital technology to 
produce, distribute and project motion pictures. For digital prints to be created, a digital 
master is needed. This is already available for movies that have been edited digitally 
(figure 1). Movies which do not go through a digital editing process need to be scanned 
to create a digital master so that the digital prints can be made. The digital process 
converts each frame of the film into a digital image, composed of an array of millions of 
elements known as ‘pixels’ (figure 1a). Even today almost all movies create a digital 
master as this is required for TV and DVD masters and this master can be utilised to 
create digital prints. The final product can be distributed via hard drives, DVDs or 
satellite and projected using a digital projector instead of a conventional film projector.  
Figure 1: The 35mm Process                            Figure 1a: The Digital Process 
                      Figure 1a: The Digital Process 
 
Faced with this innovation and fully aware of how digital distribution impacted 
negatively on the major record labels, the US studios find themselves challenged by a 
new generation of entrepreneurs; armed with a combination of ever more affordable 
filmmaking tools, widening access to broadband networks and mobile communication 
devices operating on digital platforms. Such profound change in the way entertainment is 
being consumed across the globe has created a potential ‘tipping point’ in the movie 
business.  
 
Independence Day 
In this first part the author considers that the basic assumptions around the way in 
which audiences engage with movies need to be re-examined in light of three 
contributory factors. First, both cinema audiences and DVD sales have been in relative 
decline in a number of key markets over the past four years (Waterman, 2005). Although 
the UK reported box office receipts of £904M in 2007 (8% increase on 2006) this was 
driven by the release of three Hollywood sequels – Harry Potter And The Order Of The 
Phoenix, Pirates Of The Caribbean: At World's End and Shrek The Third. These three 
‘tent pole’ movies1 generated between them over £252M or just under 30% of total 
revenue. However, total box-office admissions in European Union countries, fell 2.2% in 
2007 compared to 2006, (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2008). Second, the creative 
and commercial barriers which have kept cinema tied to the major US studios are under 
threat through technological developments in the way movies are created, stored, 
distributed and exhibited. Replacing celluloid film with d-cinema technology will 
arguably provide enormous opportunities for the exhibitor market (Elberse & Eliashberg, 
2003). 
Finally, a recent phenomenon forces us to consider the possible collapse of the 
cinema industry through the demise of the ‘release window’ agreement between the 
studios and the cinema operators. Here, first run movies are shown in the cinema for up 
to six months before release in other formats.   Hollywood itself broke away from its 
traditional release strategies several years ago with the introduction of global, single day 
release date for ‘tent pole’ movies, including Lord of the Rings, The Matrix and Pirates 
of the Caribbean, instead of sequential releases by country. In addition to reducing piracy, 
it is argued that a single, global release date also maximises the marketing impact of 
advertising spending for a film. This strategy not only helps to increase the opening 
weekend box office but also prevents negative word of mouth affecting audiences. The 
year 2006 set new standards for global single day release strategies with phenomenal 
starting box offices for X-Men and DaVinci Code, which were both savaged by critics 
afterwards (Culkin and Morawetz, 2007); in this scenario a lack of consumer insight had 
little negative  impact on the all important opening weekend at the box office. If 
Hollywood studios take advantage of the interest derived from a successful marketing 
campaign by releasing a film simultaneously across several territories, why not release a 
film simultaneously across several platforms in one country to maximise marketing 
spending for a smaller film?  
A recent study by Gerbrandt (2006) found that thirty-six percent of cinema 
audiences said they would skip theatrical releases altogether and rent the movie on DVD 
instead if a movie were released on both platforms simultaneously. The study also found 
that because of their lack of commitment to the cinema movie experience, younger movie 
consumers posed the biggest threat to the exhibition community and the greatest 
opportunities for those engaged in alternative platforms.  The problem for the studios, as 
they seek to retain control of product distribution - and effectively profit - is that they 
face the same disruption as that of the music industry conglomerates when confronted by 
the social entrepreneur, Shawn Fanning who founded Napster - a decentralised, easily-
distributed programme which allowed users to share music and other files directly from 
peer-to-peer over the internet. So, the studios recognise the enormous cost savings 
afforded by the adoption of d-cinema but cannot ignore the damage caused in the early 
part of the twenty-first century to the intellectual copyright holders in another part of the 
entertainment industry. We now move on to consider how that disruption is being played 
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  A tent pole movie is considered the studio's major release in any given season – usually summer – which is 
accompanied by an enormously wide release.  The theory is that the studio's other pictures will be "held up" by this tent 
pole and provide a profitable summer season. It is increasingly the start of, or an installment in, a franchise. 
out in the movie market before reviewing the research methodology employed in this 
study.  
 
Paths of Glory 
This section places digital cinema in the context of localised technological change 
which draws together innovation, adoption and diffusion focusing the analysis on the 
determinants of the adoption process (Rogers, 2003). Here adoption is viewed as a 
complementary component of a broader process of adjusting the technology when 
unexpected events in the product and factor markets push firms towards a creative 
reaction. An early observation of this phenomenon came from Zvi Griliches (1957) 
whose research into hybrid corn found that the adoption of a new technology was not a 
single event. Instead it was influenced by a series of developments that occurred at 
different rates across geographical space. His work demonstrated the numerous 
individual decisions and economic calculations that drove new hybrid corn technology 
forward. Antonelli (2006a) has argued that this is important for European Economists 
who, consider growth and change rather than equilibrium as the relevant object of 
analysis and, hence, values historic time and philological investigation as basic tools to 
study the dynamics of social events (p51). This is in sharp contrast to Friedman et al from 
the Chicago School of Economics who would contest that the purposeful, rational 
behavior of forward-looking, profit-seeking economic agents will inevitably override the 
effects of events in the past and avoid ‘lack of foresight’ situations which lead to 
outcomes that offer lower payoffs than some hypothetical - but unattainable - alternative 
(Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995).  
Anotelli’s argument draws heavily on the notion of path dependence elaborated 
by the work of David (1985) and Arthur (1989). The general theory of which assumes, 
that, buyers rarely have access to perfect information with which to make rational 
decisions. It further purports that, current choices are influenced by earlier decisions 
which in turn limit later choices, channeling the sequence of economic outcomes along 
one possible path rather than another (Anotelli, 2006a). In part, the difference between 
path-dependent and "path-independent" processes can be explained by the fact that 
foresight doesn't matter for path-independent processes (Purfett, 2008). Regardless of the 
journey, path-independent processes will invariably lead to a set of predictable outcomes 
- those that lead to the most efficient and produce maximum payoffs. However, path-
dependent processes have multiple potential outcomes, and the outcome selected is not 
necessarily the one producing maximum payoffs. This contrast, to the results of standard 
economic analysis is part of what makes path dependence interesting in this present study 
as is discussed shortly.  
In Arthur's (1989) basic analytical framework, "small events," which he treated as 
random, lead to early fluctuations in the market shares of competing techniques. As 
Purfett (2008) goes on to argue, these fluctuations are magnified by positive feedbacks, 
because techniques with larger market shares tend to be more valuable to new adopters. 
As a result, one technique grows in market share until it is "locked in" as a de facto 
standard. Within this context the role of private and public sector agents is interesting in 
that they are both seeking to influence the adoption of competing technologies as a way 
of developing local markets. And, in this respect they exhibit Schumpeterian tendencies 
in that, ‘every social environment has its own ways of filling the entrepreneurial function’ 
(1949:70). Thereby supporting the notion that one outcome of a market disruption is that 
it brings with it multiple and mutually exclusive solutions. This in turn leads to the 
development of many different standards if no supplier can achieve early market 
leadership which can lead to ‘lock in’. Multi-standards in digital cinema is not a desired 
outcome for the studios that have made a significant investment over 75 years to ensure a 
single standard (35mm film) operating globally (David, 1987). Whilst path dependence 
provides a framework upon which to base this study it requires a dataset on which to test 
the hypothesis. D-cinema technology is a new and unproven product in a relatively stable 
market and has yet to cross Geoffrey Moore’s ‘chasm’ (1990) as is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Path to Mainstream Digital Cinema 2007 
 
 
Consequently, the author has turns to the work of Clayton Christensen (1997, 2003) who 
has written on the impact of disruptive technologies in seemingly stable markets; he 
states disruptive technology is in essence, simpler, cheaper, and more reliable and 
convenient than established technologies (Christensen, 2003:192).  In this context, low-
end disruptions are similar to what Schumpeter referred to as ‘creative destruction’ 
(1942:82-83) in so much that low-end disruptions create a step-change cost reduction 
within an industry. However, this is achieved by entrant firms destroying the incumbents. 
New-market disruption, in contrast, entails a period of substantial creative creation - new 
consumption - before the destruction of the old occurs (Christensen, 2003:70). Based on 
their ability to see opportunity from a fresh perspective, new entrants are able to develop 
disruptive innovations that appeal to emerging market segments and to eventually 
supersede prior industry leaders (Slater & Mohr, 2006; Culkin & Smith, 2000). In line 
with previous studies (Stoneman, 2002; David, 1985) the existence of two key drivers in 
technological change - bias and rivalry between competing technologies – are evident in 
the digital cinema adoption process. Bias in terms that adoption favours the large 
American studios by reducing costs significantly. Rivalry, not only as it exists between 
old and new technologies (celluloid vs. digital) but also in the attempted imposition of a 
minimum operating standard for the new technology itself (1.3k [low end digital 
projection] vs. 2 or 4k (high end digital projection).  
In order to provide some background on the technical issues involved in Digital 
cinema there is basically one projection technology, several server solutions, but no one 
global standard. All digital cinema projectors currently deployed are built using Texas 
Instruments’ DLP Cinema2 which can display 2,000 horizontal lines of resolution (in a 
2,048 x 1,080 chip), compared to its m10 and m15 chips that had 1,280 x 1,024 
resolution (roughly 1.3K). In July 2005 the DCI3 published its final overall system 
requirements and specifications for digital cinema, opting for a scalable solution from 2K 
to 4K (4,000 x 2,000); thereby leaving the decision to which projector technology will be 
used in theatres to the market. Whether or not Digital Cinema will provide new entrants 
with the opportunity to create a ‘new value network’ in the movie industry will depend 
ultimately on their ability to augment their skill set with the capabilities to serve 
mainstream customers as well. This paper is part of a global study of digital cinema and 
in this next section the author briefly describes the research methodology employed in 
this study.  
 
The Third Man …..in the research methodology debate 
This study embraces a mixed methods approach which provides the potential to 
reduce some of the problems associated with singular methods especially in analyzing the 
early (and current) stages of the technology adoption cycle. This pragmatic approach 
does not sit well with purists who would argue that “accommodation between paradigms 
is impossible . . .” (Guba, 1990:p81). However, embracing the strengths and weaknesses 
of quantitative and qualitative research puts a researcher in a position to mix or combine 
strategies and to use what Johnson and Turner (2003) call the fundamental principle of 
mixed research. According to this principle, researchers should collect multiple data 
using different strategies, approaches, and methods in such a way that the resulting 
mixture or combination is likely to result in complementary strengths and nonoverlapping 
weaknesses. In complex or emerging (international) markets mixed methods research 
frequently results in superior research compared to a single method approach (Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). A mixed method approach provides opportunities to react to, 
reflect upon and incorporate emerging themes in a dynamic system which requires the 
researcher to embrace expansive and creative lines of inquiry. Research into the movie 
industry is fraught with difficulties. First, there is the secretive nature of deal making at 
all stages of the value network from script development, through green-lighting a project 
to sales and distribution across many territories (Daniels et al, 1998). and finally audience 
measurement; as a consequence there is little published data available to analyse. The fact 
that this is part of a four country study poses a challenge in terms of interviewing key 
players. This is further exasperated when there are both private and public players 
engaged in the process. 
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  TI’s projection technology gained widespread approval when it unveiled its so-called 2K chip (called the m25 by TI). 
3
 The DCI (Digital Cinema Incentive) was formed in 2002, a joint venture of the seven major Hollywood studios 
(Disney, Fox, MGM, Paramount, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Universal and Warner Bros) it effectively dwarfed the 
importance of the other institutions to establish guidelines for digital cinema into. 
One of the ways that the author and other colleagues working in this field (Hardy 
et al, 2007) has found to overcome part of this problem is to take advantage of what 
Maskell et al have referred to as temporary clustering (2006:997). This approach 
recognises that movie business people and cinema professionals regularly meet at 
conventions, festivals and conferences. Here, their latest and most advanced findings, 
inventions and products are demonstrated and evaluated through a mix of exhibitions and 
seminars. The benefits are clear if one makes the most use of the networking 
opportunities - the existence of local buzz of high quality and relevance leads to a more 
dynamic cluster (Bathelt, 2004:45) which for the researcher provides follow up 
interviewing opportunities. As such the existence of temporary clustering in the movie 
industry is particularly well-suited to research into d-cinema and the next section will 
provide a snap shot of the journey, examining the emerging strategies amongst actors in 
response to this disruption focusing on three territories, the UK, USA and India.  
 
Around The World in 80 Days 
The first commercial digital screening (Star Wars) took place in May 1999; since 
when there have been a number of false dawns for entrepreneurs. As with any technology 
adoption process conversion has created unforeseen problems and opportunities. The US 
movie studios have tried to control roll out through a ‘stick and stick’ approach - the 
imposition of minimum standards by which to exhibit their product linked to a threat of 
withholding digital product if the technology does not meet this standard. This attempt to 
control the route through the adoption and diffusion stage has elicited interesting 
responses (Culkin & Randle, 2003).   
 
Table 1: D-Cinema Screens by Region 
Table 1: D-Cinema Screens by Region  
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Europe   0 11 8 22 30 52 229 532 747 
North America  0 15 23 80 82 90 332 2014 3536 
Central and S 
America  0 1 2 7 10 12 13 16 20 
Africa Middle 
East  0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 5 
Asia-
Pacific   0 4 8 50 66 180 272 430 561 
           
World   0 31 41 159 188 335 848 2996 4869 
* Jan – June 2007         
Source: ScreenDigest, 
2007         
  
In some international markets the response has been to ignore the standards issue 
altogether, which is understandable if you are not dependent on Hollywood product 
(China and India). In other markets entrepreneurs have sidestepped the issue altogether 
and found early success in developing a product not considered important and therefore 
not covered by the standards, 3D or stereophonic cinema (USA and UK), whose original 
golden era ran from 1950 to19534. Whilst it still only accounts for less than 5% of 
screens worldwide, the number of digital screens is rising and stood at 5,500 as at 
December 2007 (table 1) with North America accounting for more than half of the total 
(Hancock, 2007). In terms of screens, the dominance of North America is even more 
marked because of a different pattern of adoption. A number of exhibitors in the United 
States have opted to substantially or completely convert their cinemas to digital 
projection, whereas in the rest of the world most installations in the pilot phase covering 
one or perhaps two screens per complex. 
As the major studios have been unable to enforcer a global standard we should not 
be surprised to see that differences between adoption patterns across territories are taking 
place, not only in line with the finding of Griliches (1957), but also with the primary 
objectives of the adoption itself. In Japan we find that exhibitors seeking to differentiate 
themselves from the competition are the main drivers of the adoption process; this is in 
parallel with the country’s manufacturers desire to lead in the technology race5 (e.g. Sony 
and their development of 4k projectors).  A similar situation to this exists in South Korea.  
However, as Hancock (2007) claims, adoption in China is being driven by the Chinese 
Government’s desire to bring cinema to a wider population than that of the big cities 
where multiplexes are concentrated. Although some 2K installations exist, digital cinema 
using lower resolution projectors (1.3k) is more widespread, providing the opportunity to 
leapfrog the need to modernise 35mm cinemas at a relatively low cost. This follows 
Christiansen’s work on disruptive technology where simpler, cheaper, new technologies 
and more reliable and convenient than established technologies. As the Chinese state is 
mostly concerned with reducing piracy and to limit the availability of Hollywood movies 
DCI compliance is less of an issue than in other territories.  
 
Case Study 1: USA 
As one might expect, the USA has taken the global lead in adopting digital 
cinema with over 4,000 screens converted by the end of 2007. Although a large territory 
North America is a very homogenous one, meaning that once an innovation is adopted 
and business models emerge the move to diffusion where one technique grows in market 
share until it is "locked in" as a de facto standard is arguably less difficult than in a 
heterogeneous market (Scott, 2005). Historically, there has been little public agency 
intervention in distribution and exhibition sectors and as the home of Hollywood 
exhibition has been forced to follow the product.  
The larger exhibition chains (or circuits) are financing the change through a mix 
of subsidy and the identification of new revenue streams. The subsidy, which is known as 
the Virtual Print Fee (VPF) model is a means of financing the conversion of the industry 
to digital cinema. A new player in the movie value chain, a third party6  purchases the 
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 Amongst other things, the decline in popularity for 3-D stemmed from the fact that two prints had to be projected 
simultaneously and they had to remain exactly alike after repair or synchronization would be lost. This is not an issue 
with d-cinema. 
5
 The growth of 3D-related technologies provides Japan’s manufacturers with an opportunity for future innovations. 
Sony’s new 4K 3D projectors, which compete with what DLP offers, are currently being tested. Their focus is on the 
development of competitive systems that only require a single projector. 
6
 A ruling handed down by the Supreme Court on May 4, 1948 declared that the five major studios of the day were 
guilty of violating antitrust laws through their subsidiaries or affiliates, owning or controlling theatres. Therefore the 
studios would be in breach of the ruling if they were seen to be directly involved in the process (Christopherson & 
Storper, 1986). 
equipment, and then recoups the cost of the equipment over time, through payments from 
distributors (who pay the majority of the cost) and exhibitors. An example of how the 
VPF model would work over the life of an agreement can be seen in table 2. However, 
such a scheme will only work for those exhibitors who are dependent on studio product. 
The smaller exhibitors recognising the risk of being isolated created the Cinema Buying 
Group (a semi-autonomous programme of the National Association of Theatre Owners 
[NATO]) which represents almost 9,000 smaller screens in the USA and Canada. The 
Group has yet to announce how its model may differ from the VPF scheme. 
 
 
Table 2 Example of the Virtual Print Fee Model 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
System Cost* 80,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Financing cost 5,836 5,556 5,006 4,416 3,739 3,011 2,229 1,389 485 
Total Annual  Cost   85,836 5,556 5,006 4,416 3,739 3,011 2,229 1,389 485 
          
Average Turn rate 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 
Number of Pictures 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Utilisation Rate (%) 80 90 90 95 95 95 95 95 95 
VPF per booking ($) 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 
Total Distrib VPF revs 8,960 10,080 10,008 10,640 10,640 10,640 10,640 10,640 10,640 
          
Exhib contribution 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 
          
No of alt cont bookings 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
VPF for alt cont ($) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total VPF for alt cont 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 
          
Total Revenue 11,760 12,880 12,880 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 
          
Amount unrecouped 74,076 66,752 58,878 49,854 40,153 29,724 18,514 6,462 -6,493 
* Does not include maintenance and installation 
 
Average Turn Rate = Average time a movie stays on screen 
Number of pictures per year = Films played on a screen per year 
Utilization rate = Depends on number of distributors signed up to VPF system 
Source: Screen Digest 
 
A further development, announced in the spring of 2007, which arguably sails close to the ‘anti-trust law’ 
wind, saw the formation of a venture called, the Digital Cinema Distribution Coalition delivery system. 
This purports to represent the first collaboration between studios and exhibitors to develop the most 
cost-effective form of digital content delivery through technologies such as satellite or digital terrestrial 
distribution. The coalition claims that it would be open and available to any content provider, vendor and 
exhibitor, including the owners, Warner Bros. Entertainment, Universal Pictures and DCIP, which is owned 
by Regal Entertainment, AMC Entertainment and Cinemark USA and represents 14,000 screens (Hancock, 
2007). As the DCIP venture – which is close to announcing its deployment methodology 
shows - the US exhibitor market is fully recognising the potential benefits of digital, 
which is moving it closer to the mainstreaming phase through a mix of studio product, 
alternative content and digital 3D which  saw close to 1,100 systems installed in the 
territory by end 2007.  
While digital cinema offers a brilliant picture quality (equal to first run 35mm), 
excellent repeatability, higher security and lower distribution costs, these factors do not 
excite American audiences offering little visual differentiator from 35mm film. The 
panacea for declining cinema receipts and movie-piracy-hysteria could therefore be 
digital stereoscopic (originally known as 3D) cinema. Prominent supporters of 3D digital 
cinema are directors James Cameron, George Lucas and Robert Rodriguez. Cameron 
believes that, in the near future, studios will release 4-5 big tentpole pictures a year in 3D, 
making it the format for must-see films that can only be experienced in a cinema. The 
first films that will take full advantage of the new technology are 3D animated films, 
which can easily be adapted for 3D projection – although a documentary of the pop 
group, U2 during the South American leg of the band's “Vertigo” tour is currently on 
release and receiving excellent critical reviews. Paramount and has predicted that by 
2009 there will be enough digital 3D content to keep at least one screen in a multiplex 
occupied full time (Toumarkine, 2007).  
 
Table 3: Box Office per Screen results 3D vs 2D 
Title Digital 3D 
screens 
2D ($) 3D ($) X Revenue 
Chicken Little 86 6,760 24,419 3.6 
Monster House 178 4,798 13,483 2.8 
Meet The 
Robinsons 
581 4,713 12,220 2.6 
Beowulf 766 3,882 10,782 2.8 
Average 403 5,038 15,226 3.0 
Source: Screen Digest 
 
Paramount-distributed Dream works Animation has also pledged that all of its 
animated titles will be in digital 3D as of the same year. From distributor and exhibitor 
perspectives, there seems to be a strong financial case for digital 3D cinema. For 
example, The Polar Express, which was released in flate screen (2D) on 3,500 screens in 
the US in 2004, generated $121 million during the holiday season. When the film was 
released in 3D the following year, it earned $40 million on just 68 IMAX screens, greatly 
outperforming the 2D release. Analysis of box office data for Chicken Little, Monster 
House, Meet the Robinsons and Beowulf  has shown that digital 3D screens generate on 
average three times more revenue, driven by a 2.4 times higher attendance ratio per 
screen when compared with 2D screenings for the all important first weekend (see table 3 
below). Moreover, the introduction of a premium pricing strategy has opened up a new 
profit share structure in which exhibitors share the resulting ‘surcharge’ revenue from 
higher ticket prices with the Studio, an incentive for both sides of the industry alike 
(Culkin & Morawetz, 2007).  
 
 
 
Case Study 2: The United Kingdom 
Through direct government intervention the UK now has the second largest 
number of digital screens after the United States. The UK Film Council (UKFC) - part of 
the Department for Culture, Music and Sport - contracted Arts Alliance Media (AAM) to 
install and operate its network of 240 digital screens. The Digital Screen Network (DSN) 
is a core element of UKFC’s strategy to broaden the range of films available to audiences 
across the UK and to support specialised films. The network is designed to operate in 
conjunction with other UK Film Council distribution and exhibition initiatives, such as 
the Print and Advertising Fund, for specialised films, and the Audience Development 
Scheme. The DSN was conceived as a ‘virtual network’ of 240 screens, located in 
approximately 200 cinemas across the UK. Screens are installed at multiplexes, 
independent cinemas and single screen venues. AAM completed the first round of 
installations (50 cinemas) in February 2006, with the rest of the screens installed by 
August 2007. In return for the UK Film Council’s financial contribution towards the 
equipment, network cinemas are contractually obliged to devote a (self-imposed) set 
percentage of playing time to specialised programming (e.g. educational orientated 
content, archive material and short films). Outside of these required slots, exhibitors can 
operate their digital projectors independently, and the existing business model of film 
acquisition through distributors will be the same (Culkin & Morawetz, 2007). The DSN 
will arguably enable local filmmakers to show their films on a regional basis within their 
own communities. However, with only 7% of its screens converted the UK still remains 
stuck in Moore’s chasm and until an alternative or amended version of the VPF model is 
agreed – most likely with Arts Alliance who recently signed up four studios to a 
European digital cinema roll-out – it is unlikely that the Government will offer any 
further subsidies to the market. 
 
Case Study 3: India 
The Indian market for digital cinema is developing rapidly although they are 
going their own way in terms of standards and systems being installed. The country is 
virtually self-sustaining in its content producing over 1,000 feature films a year. 
However, unlike the USA, India is not one but many territories. Of the 1000 films 
produced only around 250 are Hindi or Bollywood films, of which around 30% is 
exported to North America and the UK; Mumbai and the North Indian circuit account for 
rest of the Bollywood product. The other 750 movies are shot in local languages, which 
can have a fanatical following in the south (Tamil/Telugu) but rarely travel in India. 
Before the advent of digital cinema only tier I cinema centres, located in large 
metropolitan areas would receive first release prints. A typical Bollywood movie may be 
released to 150-350 cinemas, including overseas release. Tier II & III cinemas located in 
outlying areas then wait 5-8 weeks to receive the worn prints from the Tier I cinemas, 
creating several problems. In line with many other territories marketing support tails off 
after four weeks and with demand; this makes it difficult to make a return on investment.  
In addition, presentation quality suffers when working with worn prints. The 
distributor suffers, too, as the limited availability of the movie in the opening weeks 
encourages the rampant sale of pirated copies. Thus, the current film distribution model 
in India has created a downward business spiral for the owners of tier II & III cinemas. 
Electronic movie distribution would benefit these cinemas, making it possible to 
participate in the first week of movie release, increasing revenues not only at the door, 
but also in ancillary operations such as concessions and parking. In a move not dissimilar 
to that of the UK Film Council, a number of companies are also acquiring and converting 
traditional single screen venues to create digital screen networks with lower resolution 
1.3K or HD projectors, ignoring the DCI 2K/4K business model. This means that 
cinemas are able to show getting hit films into cinemas faster at a better quality. 
Increased investment in the Indian exhibition sector could also see the territory's 
box office gross increase by 30% in the next five years, linked to a strong economy, retail 
boom and rising middle class disposable incomes in addition to expansions in the 
downstream exhibition business should boost industry revenues. While multiplexes in 
India currently account for only 4% of the country's cinema screens, certain films 
generate up to 40% of their box-office revenue from them due to higher ticket prices. Six 
companies – Adlabs, PVR Cinemas, INOX Leisure, City Ventures, Shringar Cinemas 
and Cinemax Cinemas – have plans to fund ambitious nationwide multiplex circuits and 
between them, are set to open 1,500 screens (Grummitt, 2007). 
PVR is taking this a stage further with a recent announcement that it is making a 
strategic foray into smaller towns through digital theatres under the "PVR Talkies" brand. 
The company is investing Rs 2 billion to support this roll out. The first cinemas to benefit 
were in Aurangabad and Latur each with three screens that were digital ready, where 
computerised tickets are priced at Rs 40 and Rs 60. The company aims to have 200 PVR 
Talkies across 13 states and over 70 cities in the first phase. According to PVR Cinemas 
chairman Ajay Bijli, "In 1997, we enhanced the way India went to the movies…..With 
PVR Talkies, the people's cinema has arrived. It is my fervent hope that PVR Talkies will 
induce people to come back to the big screen and rediscover the true magic of the 
movies." (Bijli, 2006). Bijli went on to state that “the digital theatres in the tier II and 
tier III cities will work on the principle of digitised content being distributed to theatres 
through satellite or fibre. They will be uploaded to a digital cinema server. Digital 
projectors will be used for screening, enabling the entire system to have wide releases of 
a movie across the country.” Driven by the need to reduce significantly the amount of 
piracy - which has been taking business away from the tier II and II class cinemas – it is 
argued that nationwide screenings, will also increase the return on investment for 
producers and distributors. It is interesting to note that PVR has also recently ventured 
into the business of film distribution and set up PVR Pictures, a fully owned subsidiary of 
PVR Ltd. PVR. This initiative will potentially solidify PVR's exhibition growth whilst 
strengthening its content creation space as a part of a backward integration strategy along 
the movie value chain. To date, PVR Pictures has successfully released films produced 
by US-based production house Miramax such as Chicago.  
 
Conclusions 
It was suggested at the outset that digital cinema has reached a ‘tipping point’ and 
the process is irreversible in several territories. It has been stated that those territories, led 
by the USA, now have the momentum to carry other major territories through and beyond 
Moore’s ‘chasm’ despite the fact that the number of digital screens is rising, and stood at 
around 5,500 as at December 2007.  However, the fact that the global exhibitor industry 
has now not fully recognised a preferred single standard - driven by the US studios – 
suggests an adoption model that espouses a Schumpeterian view that, ‘every social 
environment has its own ways of filling the entrepreneurial function’ as opposed to a 
path-independent processes leading to a set of predictable outcomes (e.g. one global 
standard).  
Global standards may yet be set but that would require (large and largely self 
sufficient) territories such as China and India decide that the DCI standard has benefits 
above and beyond the technology they are currently employing – one which recognises 
the value Christensen deemed important in the adoption process – simpler, cheaper, and 
more reliable and convenient than established technologies. Unlike TV technology, it has 
been argued that the market for d-cinema is not large enough to support more than one 
standard. Furthermore, multiple standards would require multiple inventories, and a 
primary advantage of film – one standard, namely 35 mm – would be lost (Culkin & 
Randle, 2003a). Territories such as Europe which are trying to follow their own path run 
the risk of being forced to change direction as their position becomes potentially 
untenable without direct government involvement.  
In certain territories a combination of the studios and exhibitors are funding the 
change (Adner, 2002). Therefore they are likely to have the final decision on any 
particular aspect of d-cinema and will determine standards locally as in the USA. It has 
been argued that it would be uneconomic for others to establish alternatives.  However, 
3D lies outside the current standards and Sony, in particular, is focusing on the 
development of competitive systems that only require a single projector for 2D and 3D. 
One consequence of reduced distribution costs is a greater degree of flexibility providing 
improved choice to the consumer, in terms of scheduling and content. It may also lead to 
an increase in smaller local cinemas showing a greater variety of films to smaller 
audiences. Entrepreneurs are already noting that such developments will create a need for 
more sophisticated customer relationship management techniques, as well as better 
marketing, in the cinema business.  
The final word should perhaps be left with an entrepreneur operating in San 
Francisco, not far from Hollywood. In a recent interview Gary Meyer, a co-founder of 
Landmark Theatres said. "I have hope that in a couple of years, when digital becomes 
more available....With film, there are $150 shipping costs, and I have to pay a 
projectionist $16 an hour to work from noon to 11. Digital would reduce the cost and 
make it feasible.  There are creative ways. Exhibitors can either go to bed angry or wake 
up and change...." (LaSalle, 2008). The change may just not be what the studios were 
hoping for or expecting. 
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